Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 30 (2): 407 - 428 (2022)

PERTANIKA JOURNALS

SOCIAL SCIENCES & HUMANITIES

Journal homepage: http://www.pertanika.upm.edu.my/

Thailand's Balancing Behavior, 1947 – 1991: Some Empirical Evidence

Poowin Bunyavejchewin[1]*, Thapiporn Suporn[2] and Ketsarin Sirichuanjun[3]

[1]*Thammasat University Research Unit in History and International Politics, Institute of East Asian Studies, Thammasat University, Rangsit Campus, Pathum Thani 12121, Thailand*
[2]*International Affairs Division, Khon Kaen University International College, Khon Kaen University, Khon Kaen 40002, Thailand*
[3]*Institute for Urban Disease Control and Prevention, Department of Disease Control, Bangkok 10220, Thailand*

ABSTRACT

This study examines the determinants that shaped the balancing behavior of Thailand from 1947 to 1991 by testing hypotheses developed from arguments on three competing theories of balancing behavior, namely the systemic balance of power and balance of threat theories, as well as Martin's simple model of balancing behavior. We found that a combination of power, geographic distance, and perceived offensive intentions was the factor that prompted Thailand to balance against threatening states. The finding was found using quantitative data extracted from the Correlates of War (COW) Project and the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) Project and those generated by Expected Utility Generation and Data Management Program (EUGene) software to test the hypotheses. The statistical evidence confirms the historical narrative of Thai diplomatic history: that is, Thailand did not try to balance against communist China, its giant neighbor, but rather against Vietnam and Cambodia, which were perceived as essentially dangerous to the country's security and territorial integrity. In addition, we found that the major-power capability concentration of the Cold War international system had a mild effect on Thai behavior. However, it is difficult to generalize how such systemic attributes dictated directions in Thai foreign policy.

Keywords: Balancing behavior, security, Thai foreign policy, Thailand, threat

ARTICLE INFO

Article history:
Received: 17 September 2021
Accepted: 17 March 2022
Published: 30 May 2022

DOI: https://doi.org/10.47836/pjssh.30.2.01

E-mail addresses:
pw6@tu.ac.th (Poowin Bunyavejchewin)
thapsu@kku.ac.th (Thapiporn Suporn)
ketsarin.s@ddc.mail.go.th (Ketsarin Sirichuanjun)
*Corresponding author

ISSN: 0128-7702
e-ISSN: 2231-8534

INTRODUCTION

Historically, patterns in Thai foreign policy have been described by alignment flexibility, usually dubbed "bending-with-the-wind" behavior (Kislenko, 2002). Despite criticism, Thailand has observed a balanced position vis-à-vis major powers (Medeiros et al., 2008). However, its balancing act varied based on conditions at particular times, like bamboos that "bend with the wind and bow to the storm" (Dhiravegin, 1974, p. 48). Thailand's behavior has sometimes been metaphorized as a barometer of changes in the regional balance of power (see Phuangkasem, 1984).

Thailand's foreign policy appears to be a worthwhile case study in the scientific investigation of a foreign policy due to its uniqueness. It was marked by the country's fluid posture in aligning with the (emerging) nation with the strongest power projection in the relevant geography (mainland Southeast Asia). The policy is broadly referred to as behavioralism in international relations, focusing on regularities in the behavior of nation-states and their key determinants. However, many students of international relations in Thailand tend to believe that behavioralism is obsolete. As reflected in the state of the discipline, behavioral scientific research on Thai foreign policy has been scarce (Prasirtsuk, 2008). So it has in wider Thai political science scholarship (Sawasdee, 2016).

Among the rare exceptions are Phuangkasem (1980), who used social field theory to test hypotheses on Thailand's behavior, and Bunyavejchewin (2015), who applied expected utility theory to explain the Thai decision to wage war with Cambodia at the height of the Cold War. Thus, there remains a gap in the literature on Thailand's relations with the world. Filling that gap from behavioral perspectives with quantitative analytics has been a worthy aim of the present authors.

Prima facie, recent studies, mostly by the younger generation of Thai scholars, have appeared to make the international relations literature more diverse. Thai political science has been retooled toward post-positivist trends (Na Thalang et al., 2019). However, Lawlor (1996, p. 120) criticized post-positivism in policy analysis as "…a swamp of ambiguity, relativism, and self-doubt. The new argumentation… creates more problems for the policy analysis business…To paraphrase a famous Texas politician…This new argumentative dog can't hunt…." Apart from that, new research has employed various strands of social constructivism to make sense of Thailand's external policy (e.g., Busbarat, 2012; Charoenvattananukul, 2020; Yensabai, 2019). However, no recent studies quantify factors that shape directions in Thai foreign policy to the best of our knowledge.

A development that plausibly fills a missing link in research on Thailand's foreign policy is the application of statistics. By combining quantitative scientific evidence with the existing literature, we could achieve a synergy allowing us to understand Thailand's foreign policy better. More specifically, research on Thailand's balancing behavior deserves more attention.

Accordingly, this study examines Thailand's foreign policy behavior through the lens of behavioralism. We explain the balancing behavior of Thailand in the Cold War period (1947–1991) through statistical analyses using quantitative datasets. The questions this study explores are as follows:

- What or whom did Thailand balance against during the Cold War?
- How can we explain Thailand's balancing behavior in that period?
- What factors were at play?

We first summarize the main arguments derived from competing theories on balancing behavior used to generate hypotheses for this study. We then outline the research design and provide details of the predictor and outcome variables, data sources, and analysis methods. Next, we present the results of our analyses and discuss statistical evidence. Finally, we conclude with a summary of general explanations on the balancing behavior of Cold War Thailand and a note on the limitations of this study.

Theories on Balancing Behavior

We addressed the abovementioned questions by testing hypotheses derived from theories on balancing behavior, namely the systemic balance of power and balance of threat theories and the simple model of balancing behavior. Their central arguments are summarized below.

Systemic Balance of Power Theory. Balance of power theory is probably the most widely applied analytical tool in studying politics among nations. Nevertheless, it has various explanatory versions—the most popular yet most problematic version is Waltz's (1979) systemic theory, often called neorealism. Neorealism— aiming to be a general theory at the systemic level—narrowly explains long-term recurrent patterns of international outcomes. In a nutshell, the balance of power behavior among states is structurally induced by the anarchical structure of the international system. Given the systemic constraints facing states, they tend to balance each other to prevent any of them from growing sufficiently strong to become an unchecked hegemon and unilateral power (Waltz, 1979). A neorealist theory thus considers power a threat, as the self-help structure inherently implies that power imbalances are essentially dangerous (Martin, 2003).

In neorealism, "[t]he theory, like the story, of international politics is written in terms of the great powers of an era" (Waltz, 1979, p. 72). Thus, Waltz's explanation of systemic balance of power behavior was primarily concerned with the behavior of major powers rather than that of minor ones. He wrote:

> Theories that apply to systems are written in terms of the systems' principal parts. It would be as ridiculous to construct a theory of international politics based on Malaysia and Costa Rica as it would be to construct an economic theory based on the minor firms in a sector of an economy. (Waltz, 1979, p. 72)

Applying the systemic balance of power theory to explain the behavior of minor power states is difficult. Despite this, some scholars have argued that Waltz's neorealist theory is applicable in explaining and predicting an individual state's behavior (e.g., Elman, 1996; Labs, 1992; Telbami, 2002). Nonetheless, as the theory was originally constructed as systemic and not as one of foreign policy, to use it at another level of analysis will inevitably attract the level-of-analysis problem (see Martin, 2003).

The argument becomes a tautology by positing systemic balancing prepositions in a state-level case study. For example, balancing is normal state behavior and can be predicted solely by a general law governing international politics. Nevertheless, as Waltz (1971, p. 471) contended, "structural constraints are barriers, but men can try to jump over them. Structure shapes and limits choices; it establishes behavioral tendencies without determining behavior." His words seem to leave room for the possibility that other factors may shape the behavior of states. It thus requires what Singer (1961) called an "act of translation," that is, theoretical adaptation.

Balance of Threat Theory. The balance of threat theory, proposed by Walt (1985, 1987, 1988), can be seen as a refinement of Waltz's (1979) systemic balance of power theory. While conceding that balancing is typical state behavior, Walt argued that states' balancing is not in response to relative power alone but rather to threats. That is, states do not balance other power with increasing capabilities. Instead, they balance against a threatening one.

In the balance of threat theory, states' balancing behavior, especially alliance formation, is precipitated by imbalances of threat. One state or entente becomes dangerous to others because of its aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive capability, and perceived aggressive intentions. Overall, other things being equal, the higher a state's *perceived* threat level, the higher the chance it will trigger a balancing response by others (Walt, 1988). The theory's hypotheses on the sources of threat are as follows. Ceteris paribus:

- The larger a state's total resources (e.g., population, economic-industrial capacity, military capability, and technological advancements), the greater a threat it can pose to others;
- The nearer a state is to others, the greater a threat it can pose to them;
- The larger a state's offensive capabilities, defined in terms of its capacity to threaten the territorial security of another state at a bearable cost, the greater a threat it can pose to others; and
- The more a state's intentions are viewed as dangerous and hostile, the greater a threat it can pose to others when compared to that of a state with perceived status-quo intent (Walt, 1987).

Unit-level variables are incorporated in Walt's explanation. However, relative power remains highly significant when states make decisions around alignment. The balance of threat theory still holds that the systemic structural pressures remain and prevail in influencing the behavior of states, and balancing is the norm. Regardless of the critiques, the crucial contribution of Walt's theory is to bring geography back into a contemporary realist explanation of balancing behavior. It allows realists to say more about state behavior than the standard Waltzian account, although there is no consensus on how geographic distance determines behavioral action (e.g., Mearsheimer, 2001; Parent & Rosato, 2015; Snyder, 1996; Taliaferro, 2000).

Arguably, geographic factors—above all else, location and distance—are immensely influential in shaping threat perceptions and policy responses. It is best exemplified through the notion of the loss-of-strength gradient (LSG), devised by Boulding (1962), which describes distance as a diminution of capability, and by extension, a state's ability for power projection declines with increasing distance. Thus, location and distance should be relative rather than absolute variations (Starr, 2005). The threat is a product of power and geography (see Jaewook, 2020; Parent & Rosato, 2015). It may explain why European powers have tended not to combine against the US (see Walt, 2002).

Thus, nearby states have a greater propensity to be concerned about situations in countries near them, particularly those with whom they share borders, rather than those far away (Chan, 2013). As proximity increases opportunities for interaction, their close distance risks their involvement in events, such as boundary skirmishes, probably instigating armed conflicts. The more neighbors a state shares borders with, the higher the chance it will be enmeshed in militarized disputes (Starr & Most, 1976). As a result, the US, a major insular power surrounded by only two weaker neighbors, has fewer historical enemies than China and larger nations in Europe (Chan, 2013).

Besides geographic distance and barriers, recent works have postulated that the nature of power a state possesses affects other states' threat perceptions and the likelihood they will build up national armaments and combine against it. For example, Levy and Thompson (2005, 2010) articulated that land powers pose greater threats than sea powers. Accordingly, the former tends to be perceived as essentially dangerous and more likely to provoke balancing than the latter. It is seemingly true in the case of major powers, as they are more vulnerable to dangers from continental land states than powerful but distant maritime powers (Parent & Rosato, 2015).

Simple Model of Balancing Behavior. The level-of-analysis problem has prevailed when systemic theories' balancing propositions are used to explain behavioral patterns of state actions at the unit level. Notwithstanding this, systemic theories, notably neorealism, and semi-systemic conceptions like Walt's balance of threat

theory, remain insightful in explaining state behavior; however, translation—converting systemic variables into corresponding state-level ones— is necessary (Martin, 2003). Despite it not being a complete explanatory model, Martin's (2003) simple modeling of balancing behavior, a refinement of Waltz's (1979) systemic balance of power theory, offers practical strategies for our study.

As problems using balancing theories usually lie in the imprecise definition of balancing and not in the theories themselves, a simple yet viable analytical solution is to develop a useful definition for balancing as foreign policy behavior (Martin, 2003). It is vital, as balancing has been used in various analytical contexts, such as evaluating state behavior and the outcome of the anarchical systemic structure (Claude, 1989). Two variables have prevailed in scholarly debates on balancing: the state's perception of a threat and motivations. Thus, in Martin's simple model of balancing behavior, threat perceptions and motivations were integrated into the definition of balancing instead of being placed separately under the assumptions. He defined balancing as "a state's attempt to counter an external threat" (Martin, 2003, p. 72).

Balancing is an action carried out by a state to counter a perceived threat rather than appease, accommodate, or hide from it (Martin, 2003). Martin's simple model of balancing behavior comprises two constituents: threat perception and action in response to the perceived threat. Separating how states perceive threats from responding to them allows researchers to test hypotheses derived from competing theories and compare key variables relevant to each process (Martin, 2003). This strategy, we argue, is more practical than other approaches. Therefore, we applied Martin's (2003) model to explain Thailand's balancing behavior during the Cold War.

METHODS

Hypotheses

This study defines balancing as a state's effort to counter an external threat. The key question is what constitutes a threat. Based on the earlier theoretical considerations, we develop hypotheses on Thailand's balancing behavior and test them against relevant data from 1947 to 1990. Our first set of hypotheses focuses on the effects of power, defined solely in material capability, on Thailand's balancing behavior.

> H1 Thailand tends to internally and externally balance against the strongest state in the relevant geography, regardless of all else.

Hypothesis 1 addresses the unit-level relative power. It refers to the level of power possessed by another state, which acts as a driving force that triggers Thailand's balancing behavior. Relevant geography refers to the geographic region in which Thailand is located—East Asia in general and mainland Southeast Asia in particular—as Bangkok may be no pressing reason to balance against states like Argentina and Ethiopia, which are far away.

Hypothesis 2 deals with the systemic-level power structure. It refers to the concentration of capabilities within the international system and its impact on Thailand's balancing act.

H2 Fluctuations in systemic capability concentration affect Thailand's balancing behavior, both internally and externally.

It seeks to test claims made by scholars that adjustments in the capability concentration at the systemic level do not substantially influence the behavior of medium-size or smaller powers, including Thailand when compared to that of major powers. For example, Phuangkasem (1980) found that internal considerations overrode the external factors in shaping the foreign policy behavior of Thailand in the mid–Cold War period.

The third hypothesis determines the threat level, constituted by proximity, relatively strong capability, and perceived hostile intentions that prompt Thailand's counter-action.

H3 Thailand tends to internally and externally balance against a state with closer proximity, relatively robust capability, and perceived belligerent intentions and counter a coalition whose members share the preceding conditions.

However, the constituents of threat here are selectively derived from the prepositions of the balance of threat theory, as indicated above. Our selection criteria are based on the availability of reliable empirical data—viz., measurable units (e.g., material capabilities, number of signed treaties).

Our last hypothesis deals with Thailand's alliance portfolios and major powers involved in peninsular Southeast Asia during the Cold War. It explores the extent to which empirical evidence matches a chronological narrative of Thai diplomatic history: that is, the American abandonment of their mainland Southeast Asian allies in the mid-1970s forced Bangkok to reconcile and limitedly align with Beijing to deter Hanoi's aggression (Khoman, 1982; Viraphol, 1982).

H4 The lower the similarity in alliance portfolios of Thailand and the US, the higher the similarity in alliance portfolios of Thailand and China.

If hypothesis 4 holds, the data on its alliance portfolios shall reflect the country's attempt to balance Vietnam externally by taking sides with China to keep the aggressive Vietnamese-Soviet expansion at bay. It derives from the fact that China was the only nearby country with the ability to counter Vietnam's expanding power.

Data Sources

This study used data from open-access databases, namely the Correlates of War (COW) Project and the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) Project. To analyze Thailand's balancing behavior,

it relied heavily on the COW National Material Capabilities (v5.0) dataset (Singer et al., 1972) and the ATOP (v5.0) datasets (Leeds et al., 2002). The Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) scores, provided by COW, measured Thailand and relevant parties' relative capabilities. In addition, the state-year dataset extracted from ATOP was used as a reference for the total number of alliances that Thailand was a member of from 1947 to 1991.

Aside from the preceding datasets, we used the Expected Utility Generation and Data Management Program (EUGene) developed by Bennett and Stam (2000) to compute the tau-b scores formulated by de Mesquita (1975) based on the original COW datasets in order to measure the similarity in Thailand and relevant actors' alliance portfolios. EUGene software was employed for its substantive utility in dealing with complex formulas; otherwise, all the data would need to be calculated manually. In addition, this study used the data reported by Suporn et al. (2021) to evaluate how the concentration of capabilities affected Thailand's balancing behavior, which calculated the COW data using Singer et al.'s (1972) formula. Finally, besides quantitative data, this study treated secondary qualitative sources on Thai security perceptions, especially those written by high-level policymakers, as supplementary data to define relevant variables for hypothesis testing.

Variables

Outcome Variables. Two outcome variables were set for hypotheses 1 to 3, namely Thailand's CINC score from 1947 to 1991 and the total number of ATOP alliances Thailand committed to for each year of observation from 1947 to 1991. The CINC score is a capability indicator developed by Singer et al. (1972) to measure each nation's percentage share of the total capability pool of all states in the international system. It is computed using six variables: military expenditure and personnel, energy consumption, iron, and steel production, and urban and total population. Widely used in the subfield of international conflict, the CINC score accurately measures states' current overall power (e.g., Quackenbush, 2015; Sabrosky, 1985). The total number of ATOP alliances refers to the sum of alliances reported in the ATOP (v5.0) state-year dataset that each nation has any active commitments during the years observed. In ATOP datasets, allied commitments include defensive, offensive, neutrality, non-aggression, and consultation obligations toward another state (see Leeds et al., 2002). We *multiplied* all CINC scores by 100 to ease the interpretability of the results. Here, the CINC score can therefore take values from 0.01 to 100.

The outcome variable for hypothesis 4 was the tau-b score for Thailand and China from 1949 to 1991. The period differed from the abovementioned years because communist China was founded in October 1949. The tau-b score, or τ_b,

was constructed by de Mesquita (1975) to evaluate similarities in alliance portfolios by measuring the shared interests of a state pair. An alliance portfolio refers to each nation's entire range of alliance commitments. The score ranges from -1 to 1. Whereas -1 indicates that the alliance portfolios of a state pair are completely different, 1 indicates that they are identical. The former means that the pair shares no common interests, whereas the latter means that the pair has identical shared interests. States tend to align with those they share common interests and are less likely to do so with those they have nothing in common.

Predictor Variables. The predictor variables for hypotheses 1 and 3 were set as the CINC scores of China, Vietnam, and Cambodia from 1947 to 1991. These three countries were selected as they were perceived as Thailand's adversaries at certain times (e.g., Bunyavejchewin, 2015; Jha, 1978; Viraphol, 1982). The factors are contributing to Thai threat perceptions varied, ranging from geographic proximity to countries' level of support for the Thai communist insurgency. It is noteworthy that Myanmar was deliberately omitted; this is because, regardless of nationalist discourses, Thailand's bilateral relations with Myanmar were relatively positive during the Cold War (Ganesan, 2006). In addition, military elites in the two capitals have reportedly had close ties and shared interests, including in the international political domain (Chambers, 2021).

To enhance interpretability, we multiplied the CINC scores by 100. If hypothesis 1 held, only the increasing CINC score of China would explain Thailand's CINC score and its total number of ATOP alliances, as China had the most robust capability in Thailand's region in the Cold War years. In contrast, if hypothesis 3 held, the increasing CINC score of Vietnam or those of both Vietnam and Cambodia would explain the outcome variables described above.

For hypothesis 2, the predictor variable was the multiplied concentration index of major-power capabilities (PERCON), which was computed using the concentration index of major-power capabilities (CON) as reported in Suporn et al. (2021). It measured fluctuations in the system's capability concentration during the Cold War. The CON index is calculated based on the standard deviation of the capabilities of major powers. It uses the capabilities of major powers alone as its military reach is effectively global (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). Here, the term "major power" strictly refers to major-power states as listed in the COW State System Membership (v2016) dataset (Correlates of War Project, 2017). The CON value ranges from .00 to 1.00: it comes closer to 0 when major powers are more or less equal in capabilities and closer to 1 when very few major powers have a relatively large share of major-power capabilities. In addition, the value implicitly indicates certain types of polarity, or the number of poles in the international system, that is, unipolarity, bipolarity, and

multipolarity. For ease of interpretation, we multiplied the CON index by 100. Our PERCON index then took values from 0.00 to 100. If the second hypothesis held, the PERCON value, a systemic variable, would explain Thailand's CINC score, the total number of ATOP alliances, or both. It was based hypothetically on Martin's (2003) balancing behavior model.

Finally, the predictor variable for hypothesis 4 was set as the tau-b score for Thailand and the US over the same period as the explained variable of the hypothesis. If the fourth hypothesis held, the declining tau-b score for Thailand and the US should explain the increasing tau-b score for Thailand and China. Lessening common interests between Bangkok and Washington contributed to growing mutual interest between Bangkok and Beijing.

Data Analysis

The methods of analysis included simple and multiple linear regression analyses. All statistics were calculated using the SPSS Statistics 20.0 software (IBM Corporation, 2011). Adjusted determination coefficients ($R^2_{adjusted}$) were interpreted according to Cohen (1988) criteria (*small* = .10–.29, *medium* = .30–.49, *large* ≥ .50). Each method is briefly described below.

Simple Linear Regression Analysis. Thailand's CINC score and the total ATOP alliances were regressed separately on the PERCON value. The goal was to evaluate how systemic capability concentration could explain Thailand's internal and external balancing behavior. It addressed hypothesis 2. The tau-b score of Thailand and China was regressed on the tau-b score for Thailand and the US. The objective was to assess the extent to which the alliance portfolios of Thailand and the US could explain those of Thailand and China, thus addressing hypothesis 4.

Multiple Linear Regression Analysis. Thailand's CINC score and the total number of ATOP alliances were regressed separately on the CINC scores of China, Vietnam, and Cambodia. The objectives were to determine whether the power alone or the threatening power with nearer geography could explain Thailand's internal and external balancing. It addressed hypotheses 1 and 3.

RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics

The first step in our analyses was to compute and evaluate the descriptive statistics for the data used to predict outcomes. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for predictor variables, namely the CINC scores for China, Vietnam, and Cambodia, CON, and the tau-b score for Thailand and the US. The mean CINC score values for China, Vietnam, and Cambodia were 11.08, 0.71, and 0.10, respectively. The mean PERCON value was 33.06. The average tau-b score for Thailand and the US was .26. Figure 1 presents the scatterplot of the indices for PERCON. Figure 2 presents the scatterplot of tau-b scores for both Thailand and the US and Thailand and China.

Table 1

Descriptive statistics for predictor variables

	CHNCINC	DRVCINC	CAMCINC	PERCON	TAUTHIUSA
Mean	11.080	0.709	0.100	33.056	.264
Median	11.290	0.601	0.094	32.400	.571
Maximum	12.10	1.30	0.19	40.90	.628
Minimum	9.13	0.28	0.05	24.60	-.156
Range	2.96	1.02	0.14	16.30	.784
Std. Deviation	.794	.319	.035	.028	.351
N	43	38	39	45	45

Note: CHNCINC = China's CINC score; DRVCINC = Vietnam's CINC score; CAMCINC = Cambodia's CINC score; PERCON = multiplied concentration index of major-power capabilities; TAUTHIUSA = tau-b score for Thailand and the US.



Figure 1. Scatterplot of indices for the concentration of major-power capabilities from 1947 to 1991

Note: PERCON is the multiplied concentration index of major-power capabilities.



Figure 2. Scatterplot of tau-b scores for Thailand and the US and Thailand and China

Note: TAUTHIUSA = tau-b score for Thailand and the US; TAUTHICHN = tau-b score for Thailand and China.

Simple Linear Regression Analyses

The PERCON index was used to predict Thailand's CINC score using ordinary least squares regression. A statistically significant degree of prediction was obtained, $F(1, 43) = 16.80$, $p < .001$, $R^2 = .28$, $R^2_{\text{adjusted}} = .26$. The raw regression coefficient was -0.0002, which indicated an inverse relationship between both variables. The PERCON value explained approximately 26.4% of the variance of the Thai CINC score. The PERCON index was used to predict Thailand's total number of ATOP alliances using simple linear regression. A statistically significant degree of prediction was obtained, $F(1, 43) = 55.61$, $p < .001$, $R^2 = .56$, $R^2_{\text{adjusted}} = .55$. The raw regression coefficient was -0.39, which showed an inverse relationship between both variables. The PERCON value explained approximately 55.4% of the variance of Thailand's total number of ATOP alliances.

The tau-b score for Thailand and the US was used to predict that of Thailand and China using ordinary least squares regression. The tau-b score of the former

pair significantly predicted that of the latter pair, $F(1, 41) = 114.74$, $p < .001$, $R^2 = .74$, $R^2_{adjusted} = .73$. The raw regression coefficient was -0.21, which showed an inverse relationship between variables. The tau-b score of Thailand and the US explained approximately 73% of the variance in that of Thailand and China.

Table 2

Simple regression results for Thailand's CINC score

Variable	R^2	$R^2_{adjusted}$	F	p	SE	95% CI
PERCON Value	.281	.264	16.798	.000	0.00	[0.00, 0.00]

Note: CI = confidence interval

Table 3

Simple regression results for Thailand's total number of ATOP alliances

Variable	R^2	$R^2_{adjusted}$	F	p	SE	95% CI
PERCON Value	.564	.554	55.606	.000	0.05	[-0.50, -0.29]

Note: CI = confidence interval

Table 4

Simple regression results for the tau-b score for Thailand and China

Variable	R^2	$R^2_{adjusted}$	F	p	SE	95% CI
Tau-b Score for Thailand and the US	.737	.730	114.737	.000	0.02	[-0.25, -0.17]

Note: CI = confidence interval

Multiple Linear Regression Analysis

The CINC scores of China, Vietnam, and Cambodia were used in a stepwise multiple regression analysis to predict Thailand. A stepwise multiple regression method was employed to generate the best model fit for predicting the Thai CINC score. The final model contained two of the three predictors and was arrived at in two steps with one variable removed (see Table 5). The model was statistically significant, $F(2, 35) = 197.06$, $p < .001$, and accounted for approximately 91.4% of the variance of the Thai CINC score ($R^2 = .92$, $R^2_{adjusted} = .91$). The CINC scores of Vietnam, $\beta = 1.00$, $t(35) = 19.74$, $p < .001$, and Cambodia, $\beta = 0.21$, $t(35) = 4.10$, $p < .001$, were significant predictors of Thailand's CINC score as well.

The same set of predictors was used to predict Thailand's total number of ATOP alliances using stepwise multiple regression to provide the best model fit for predicting

the sum of Thailand's ATOP alliance bonds. The final model contained two of the three predictors and was arrived at in two steps with one variable removed (see Table 6). The model was statistically significant, $F(2, 35) = 75.07$, $p < .001$, and accounted for approximately 80% of the variance of Thailand's total number of ATOP alliances ($R^2 = .81$, $R^2_{adjusted} = .80$). Vietnam's CINC score was a significant predictor of the sum of Thailand's ATOP alliance bonds, $\beta = .83$, $t(35) = 10.70$, $p < .001$. Cambodia's CINC score was a significant predictor of the same outcome variable, $\beta = -.18$, $t(35) = -2.36$, $p = .024$.

Table 5

Stepwise regression results for Thailand's CINC scores

Model	R^2	$R^2_{adjusted}$	F	p	*SE*	95% CI
1	.879	.876	262.062	.000		
Predictors:						
Vietnam's CINC Score					0.02	[0.25, 0.32]
2	.918	.914	197.062	.000		
Predictors:						
Vietnam's CINC Score					0.02	[0.27, 0.34]
Cambodia's CINC Score					0.14	[0.29, 0.85]

Note: CI = confidence interval

Table 6

Stepwise regression results for Thailand's total number of ATOP alliances

Model	R^2	$R^2_{adjusted}$	F	p	*SE*	95% CI
1	.781	.775	128.329	.000		
Predictors:						
Vietnam's CINC Score					0.23	[2.17, 3.12]
2	.811	.800	75.074	.000		
Predictors:						
Vietnam's CINC Score					0.23	[2.01, 2.95]
Cambodia's CINC Score					2.09	[-9.16, -0.67]

Note: CI = confidence interval

DISCUSSION

Based on the systemic balance of power theory, hypothesis 1 suggests a tendency for Thailand to internally and externally balance against the strongest power in the relevant geography. However, the results do not support the hypothesis: Thailand did not balance against China. It appears to be in line with Chinvanno (1991), who argued, based on primary sources from the Foreign Ministry in Bangkok, that, even during the mid-1950s, at the height of the Cold War, Thai leaders had reportedly tried to create a secret diplomatic channel for cooperative dialogue with communist China.

Contrariwise, the regression evidence indicates a strong tendency for Thailand to balance against Vietnam and Cambodia, both internally and externally. In other words, Vietnam and Cambodia's increasing material capabilities had a very large impact on Thailand's internal and external balancing, represented by the country's CINC score and the total number of ATOP alliances, respectively. Strong evidence supports hypothesis 3 on the tendency to balance against states that are more proximate, relatively stronger, and have perceived hostile intentions. It is nothing much surprising. Still, it statistically confirms the findings of earlier studies on Thai foreign policy that the balancing behavior of Thailand predominantly targeted the growing Vietnamese threat to its security interests in the region, which included Vietnam's proxy regime in Phnom Penh (e.g., Chambers, 2005; Sirichote, 1986; Viraphol, 1982).

Table 2 shows that the systemic capability concentration measured by PERCON slightly impacted Thailand's internal balancing behavior. The higher concentration of major-power capabilities was in the international system, indicating a slightly higher tendency for Thailand to keep its strength at the *same* level. The absence of internal balancing is probably explained by the lower levels of uncertainty caused by a relatively high concentration of major-power capabilities. In a highly robust system, that is, bipolarity, it is easier for policymakers to predict the behavior of other states. Moreover, it helps policy elites in smaller nations choose the right horse, as the great-power game and alliance bonds tend to be unambiguous (Singer et al., 1972).

Historically, Thailand has been less concerned about the bigger picture of great-power competition. Rather, the mindset and considerations of policy elites in Bangkok, according to former top Thai diplomats (e.g., Khoman, 1982; Viraphol, 1982), were preoccupied with the country's security and interests in its region. In 1949, Thailand swiftly aligned with the US when China became communist (Hewison, 2020). Until the US walked away in the mid-1970s, Thailand's independence and territorial integrity relied heavily on American troops stationed on its soil and American investment, such as US-sponsored infrastructure.

Given the presence of the US armed forces safeguarding its territory from external threats, the Thai military, in general, was neither designed for nor experienced

in external warfare. Conversely, its role focused heavily on internal security, such as regime legitimation and counter-insurgency (Chaloemtiarana, 1978). It helps understand why fluctuations in the international system did not substantially condition Thailand's internal balancing.

Table 7

List of formal alliances signed by Thailand

ATOP ID	Signature Year	Title
3195	1949	Treaty of Friendship between the Republic of the Philippines and the Kingdom of Thailand
3250	1954	Treaty of Friendship between the Kingdom of Thailand and the Republic of Indonesia
3260	1954	Pacific Charter; Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty[a, b]
3460	1962	Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos
3737	1975	Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Kingdom of Thailand and the People's Republic of China
3755	1976	Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia
3260.2	1977	Phase 2 of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty[c]

Note: Data extracted from the ATOP state-year dataset (Leeds et al., 2002); a = Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, or Manila Treaty, which established the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954; b = It must be noted that ATOP has classified the Thanat–Rusk communiqué of 1962 as part of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (noted as ATOP ID: 3260, Phase 2); c = This alliance was a new phase of the Treaty that formerly governed SEATO, which was disbanded in 1977 (see Buszynski, 1980)

Contrary to the abovementioned evidence on internal balancing, Table 3 shows that the systemic capability concentration greatly impacted Thailand's external balancing behavior. A one-unit difference in the systemic capability concentration was associated, on average, with a 0.39 percentage point lower likelihood that Thailand signed and participated in alliance commitments. Table 7 and Figure 3 list the formal alliances signed by Bangkok and Thailand's active alliances during the Cold War, respectively.

Our results show that fluctuations in the Cold War system impacted Thailand's internal balancing only minimally. However, such fluctuations had a considerable impact on Thailand's external balancing. The data in Tables 2 and 3 provide at least mild support for hypothesis 2. It probably sounds counter-



Figure 3. Thailand's formal alliances

Note: Data extracted from the ATOP state-year dataset (Leeds et al., 2002)

intuitive because it is slightly at odds with the existing literature, whose arguments have often downplayed the influence of the international system in Thai foreign policy directions (e.g., Phuangkasem, 1980; Suthiwart-Narueput, 1980; Viraphol, 1982). Despite this, our findings seem justifiable, at least statistically. Additionally, the findings appear somewhat in line with the recent monograph by Raymond and Blaxland (2021).

Table 4 shows that the similarity in the alliance portfolio between Thailand and the US was strongly and negatively associated with that between Thailand and China. An increase in dissimilarity in the Thai and US alliance portfolios substantially contributed to greater similarity in the alliance portfolios of Thailand and China. Hypothesis 4 is well supported by our data. This trendline seems to correspond with the opinions shared by policy elites in Bangkok, which considered the American withdrawal from mainland Southeast Asia a root cause of regional uncertainty that forced Thailand to align with communist China (e.g., Khoman, 1982).

The statistical evidence demonstrates that the systemic balance of power theory does not explain the Thai case. The emergence of a rising power in the relevant region did not prompt Thailand to perceive it as threatening, which needed to be counterbalanced. It is best exemplified that Thailand's internal and external balancing was not directed at China during the Cold War, notwithstanding the increasing Chinese capabilities.

Thailand balanced against Vietnam and Vietnamese-controlled Cambodia.

Obviously, because of their hostile actions and proximity to Thai territories, both capitals were perceived as immediate threats to the nation's security and territorial integrity (Raymond, 2020). The Thai threat perceptions of Vietnam and Cambodia were greatly intensified by the "Cambodia Problem," which began toward the end of the 1970s when Soviet-supported Vietnam seized Phnom Penh, augmented by the US retreat and abandonment of its allies in continental Southeast Asia which took place earlier (Niyomsilpa, 1989).

If an external threat is a product of power and geographic distance, with the support of the Soviet Union, Hanoi was far more dangerous to Bangkok than any other power in mainland Southeast Asia. Moreover, Vietnam's land power posed a more severe threat than communist China in wider East Asia (Niyomsilpa, 1989). The balance of threat theory in general and Martin's simple model of balancing behavior in particular tally with our findings in this regard.

Finally, our analysis shows that the concentration of major-power capabilities—the Cold War international system—profoundly impacted Thailand's balancing behavior. It is fairly in line with Labs (1992) and Goldgeier and McFaul (1992), who argued that systemic conditions shape the foreign policy behavior of smaller states. However, it is difficult to ascertain how systemic fluctuations decisively prescribed Thailand's alignment and coalition formation. Present statistics cannot tell us how the changing systemic concentration would have correlated with state-level determinants of Thai foreign policy, commonly reported in earlier research, such as regime type and nation-building history (see Neher, 1990; Phuangkasem, 1984). A considerable amount of quantitative research is needed if we must deal with these conundrums.

CONCLUSION

Four general conclusions can be drawn on Thailand's balancing behavior during the Cold War as a result of the analyses presented in this study: (a) Thailand's internal and external balancing tended to be directed at Vietnam (and its ally, Cambodia) rather than at China; (b) Thailand's balancing behavior was best explained by Martin's simple model of balancing behavior; (c) the prevalent combination of power, geographic distance, and perceived hostile intentions was the predominant determinant, which alarmed Thailand and motivated it to balance against external threats, both internally and externally; and (d) changes in the international system, as measured by the major-power capability concentration, had an effect on Thailand's foreign policy behavior, though it is unclear how this came about.

Still, we acknowledge several limitations of our analysis, especially regarding explanations. Like other systemic theories of international relations, Martin's (2013) simple model of balancing behavior has inherited a theoretical weak point

that derives from the trade-off between parsimony-seeking and case-specific understanding. The model we employed considered the Thai state a black box or unitary actor. It, in turn, restrained analytical ability in accounting for dynamics inside the box, like the impact of ideologies on individual decisions. For instance, it could not explain how the rightist beliefs of Prime Minister Thanin Kraivichien (in office: 1976-1977)—who reportedly had a pro-Taiwan stance—temporarily froze the normalization of Sino-Thai relations (US Department of State, 1977). Nor could it address the fact that Thailand did receive aid from the American intelligence agencies operating covertly against communist China (Kislenko, 2004) while attempting to create a secret channel for confidential communication with the Chinese leaders in the mid-1950s.

Finally, one should be circumspect in inferring the underlying regular patterns of Thai foreign policy from the general conclusions arrived at in this study. It is simply because the validity of our explanations of Thailand's balancing remains contextually specific. It would be statistically valid only if one were examining Cold War Thailand, whose foreign policy was exposed to specific conditions. Our conclusions do not necessarily hold for post-Cold War Thailand's actions. Therefore, it is clear that further research efforts are still necessary to sufficiently and scientifically explain Thailand's behavior from ancient to modern times.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This work was supported by Thammasat University (TUFT 66/2564); and Thammasat University Research Unit in History and International Politics (4/2564).

REFERENCES

Bennett, D. S., & Stam, A. C. (2000). EUGene: A conceptual manual. *International Interactions*, *26*(2), 179-204. https://doi.org/10.1080/03050620008434965

Boulding, K. E. (1962). *Conflict and defense: A general theory*. Harper and Brothers.

Bunyavejchewin, P. (2015). Revisiting Thailand's aggression against Cambodia, 1953-1962: An expected utility theory of war initiation. *Pertanika Journal of Social Sciences & Humanities*, *23*(2), 413-429.

Busbarat, P. (2012). A review of Thailand's foreign policy in mainland Southeast Asia: Exploring an Ideational Approach. *European Journal of East Asian Studies*, *11*(1), 127-154. https://doi.org/10.1163/15700615-20120009

Buszynski, L. (1980). Thailand and the Manila Pact. *The World Today*, *36*(2), 45-51. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40395167

Chaloemtiarana, T. (1978). Reflections on the Sarit regime and the process of political change in Thailand: Some conceptual and theoretical reassessments. *Southeast Asian Studies*, *16*(3), 400-410.

Chambers, M. R. (2005). 'The Chinese and the Thais are brothers': The evolution of the Sino–Thai friendship. *Journal of Contemporary China*, *14*(45), 599-629. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670560500205100

Chambers, P. (2021). Khaki capital and coups in Thailand and Myanmar. *Current History*, *120*(827), 221-226. https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.2021.120.827.221

Chan, S. (2013). Geography and international relations theorizing: Their implications for China. *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, *54*(4), 363-385. https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2013.861749

Charoenvattananukul, P. (2020). *Ontological security and status-seeking: Thailand's proactive behaviours during the Second World War*. Routledge.

Chinvanno, A. (1991). *Brief encounter: Sino-Thai rapprochement after Bandung, 1955-1957*. International Studies Centre, Institute of Foreign Affairs.

Claude, I. L. (1989). The balance of power revisited. *Review of International Studies*, *15*(2), 77-85. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097172

Cohen, J. (1988). *Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences* (2nd ed.). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Correlates of War Project. (2017). *State system membership list, v2016* [Data set]. The Correlates of War (COW) Project. https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/state-system-membership

de Mesquita, B. B. (1975). Measuring systemic polarity. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *19*(2), 187-216. https://doi.org/10.1177/002200277501900201

Dhiravegin, L. (1974). Thailand foreign policy determination. *Warasan Sangkhomsat*, *11*(4), 37-65.

Elman, C. (1996). Horses for courses: Why nor neorealist theories of foreign policy? *Security Studies*, *6*(1), 7-53. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419608429297

Ganesan, N. (2006). Thai-Myanmar-ASEAN relations: The politics of face and grace. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, *33*(3), 131-149. http://www.jstor.org/stable/30173022

Goldgeier, J. M., & McFaul, M. (1992). A tale of two worlds: Core and periphery in the post-Cold War era. *International Organization*, *46*(2), 467-491. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027788

Hewison, K. (2020). Black site: The Cold War and the shaping of Thailand's politics. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, *50*(4), 551-570. https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2020.1717115

IBM Corporation. (2011). *IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows*. In *SPSS Statistics* (Version 20.0) [Statistical software]. IBM Corporation. https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/ibm-spss-statistics-200-release-notes

Jaewook, C. (2020). Capability distribution between allies, geographical proximity and alliance duration. *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, *18*(1), 1-31. https://doi.org/10.14731/kjis.2020.04.18.1.1

Jha, G. (1978). Thailand's China policy. *China Report*, *14*(2), 9-14. https://doi.org/10.1177/000944557801400202

Khoman, T. (1982). National threat perceptions in East Asia-Pacific. In C. E. Morrison (Ed.), *Threats to security in East Asia-Pacific: National and regional perspectives* (pp. 19-22). D.C. Heath and Company.

Kislenko, A. (2002). Bending with the wind: The continuity and flexibility of Thai foreign policy. *International Journal*, *57*(4), 537-561. https://doi.org/10.1177/002070200205700403

Kislenko, A. (2004). A not so silent partner: Thailand's role in covert operations, counter-insurgency, and the wars in Indochina. *Journal of Conflict Studies, 24*(1), 65-96.

Labs, E. J. (1992). Do weak states bandwagon? *Security Studies*, *1*(3), 383-416. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419209347476

Lawlor, E. F. (1996). Review works: *The argumentative turn in policy analysis and planning*, Frank Fischer, John Forester; *Narrative policy analysis: Theory and practice, Emery Roe; Policy change and learning: An advocacy coalition approach, Paul Sabatier, Hank C. Jenkins-Smith. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, *15*(1), 110-121. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3325199

Leeds, B., Ritter, J., Mitchell, S., & Long, A. (2002). Alliance treaty obligations and provisions, 1815-1944. *International Interactions*, *28*(3), 237-260. https://doi.org/10.1080/03050620213653

Levy, J. S., & Thompson, W. R. (2005). Hegemonic threats and great-power balancing in Europe, 1495-1999. *Security Studies*, *14*(1), 1-33. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410591001465

Levy, J. S., & Thompson, W. R. (2010). Balancing on land and at sea: Do states ally against the leading global power? *International Security*, *35*(1), 7-43. https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00001

Martin, S. B. (2003). From balance of power to balancing behavior: The long and winding road. In A. K. Hanami (Ed.), *Perspectives on structural realism* (pp. 61-82). Palgrave Macmillan US. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403981707_4

Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). *The tragedy of great power politics*. W. W. Norton.

Medeiros, E. S., Crane, K., Heginbotham, E., Levin, N. D., Lowell, J. F., Rabasa, A., & Seong, S. (2008). *Pacific currents: The responses of US allies and security partners in East Asia to China's rise*. Rand Corporation. https://doi.org/10.7249/MG736

na Thalang, C., Jayanama, S., & Poonkham, J. (Eds.). (2019). *International relations as a discipline in Thailand: Theory and sub-fields*. Routledge.

Neher, C. D. (1990). The foreign policy of Thailand. In D. Wurfel & B. Burton (Eds.), *The political economy of foreign policy in Southeast Asia* (pp. 177-203). Palgrave Macmillan.

Niyomsilpa, S. (1989). *Thailand's security relationship with China: Implications and prospects* [Unpublished Master's thesis]. Australian National University.

Parent, J. M., & Rosato, S. (2015). Balancing in neorealism. *International Security*, *40*(2), 51-86. https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00216

Phuangkasem, C. (1980). *Thailand in Southeast Asia: A study of foreign policy behavior (1964-1977)* [Doctoral thesis]. University of Hawai'i at Mānoa.

Phuangkasem, C. (1984). *Thailand's foreign relations, 1964-80* (ISEAS Occasional Paper No. 74). Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Prasirtsuk, K. (2008). Teaching international relations in Thailand: Status and prospects. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, *9*(1), 83-105. https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcn018

Quackenbush, S. L. (2015). *International conflict: Logic and evidence*. CQ Press/SAGE.

Raymond, G. V. (2020). Strategic culture and Thailand's response to Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia, 1979-1989: A Cold War epilogue. *Journal of Cold War Studies*, *22*(1), 4-45. https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00924

Raymond, G., & Blaxland, J. (2021). *The US-Thai alliance and Asian international relations: History, memory and current developments*. Routledge.

Sabrosky, A. N. (Ed.). (1985). *Polarity and war: The changing structure of international conflict*. Westview Press.

Sarkees, M. R., & Wayman, F. W. (2010). *Resort to war: 1816-2007*. CQ Press.

Sawasdee, S. N. (2016). The development of political science in Thailand. *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics*, *1*(1), 88-103. https://doi.org/10.1177/2057891115624019

Singer, J. D. (1961). The level-of-analysis problem in international relations. *World Politics*, *14*(1), 77-92. https://doi.org/10.2307/2009557

Singer, J. D., Bremer, S., & Stuckey, J. (1972). Capability distribution, uncertainty, and major power war, 1820-1965. In B. Russett (Ed.), *Peace, war, and numbers* (pp. 19-48). SAGE.

Sirichote, T. (1986). *Realism and Thailand's foreign policy after the Second World War* [Master's thesis]. The Australian National University.

Snyder, G. H. (1996). Process variables in neorealist theory. *Security Studies*, *5*(3), 167-192. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419608429279

Starr, H. (2005). Territory, proximity, and spatiality: The geography of international conflict. *International Studies Review*, *7*(3), 387-406. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3699756

Starr, H., & Most, B. A. (1976). The substance and study of borders in international relations research. *International Studies Quarterly*, *20*(4), 581-620. https://doi.org/10.2307/2600341

Suporn, T., Bunyavejchewin, P., Faugchun, P., & Sukthungthong, N. (2021). The Cold War, old and new: A preliminary comparative study of polarity, polarisation, and elements of (in) stability. *Pertanika Journal of Social Sciences & Humanities*, *29*(2), 903-922. https://doi.org/10.47836/pjssh.29.2.09

Suthiwart-Narueput, S. (1980). *A strategy for survival of Thailand: Reappraisal and readjustment in her alliances (1969-1976)* [Doctoral thesis]. University of Oklahoma.

Taliaferro, J. W. (2000). Security seeking under anarchy: Defensive realism revisited. *International Security*, *25*(3), 128-161. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2626708

Telbami, S. (2002). Kenneth Waltz, neorealism, and foreign policy. *Security Studies*, *11*(3), 158-170. https://doi.org/10.1080/714005344

US Department of State. (1977, July 26). *Deputy Secretary Christopher's call on Prime Minister Thanin. [TE–Telegram (cable)]*. WikiLeaks. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1977WELLIN03050_c.html

Viraphol, S. (1982). National threat perceptions: Explaining the Thai case. In C. E. Morrison (Ed.), *Threats to security in East Asia-Pacific: National and regional perspectives* (pp. 145-153). D.C. Heath and Company.

Walt, S. M. (1985). Alliance formation and the balance of world power. *International Security*, *9*(4), 3-43. https://doi.org/10.2307/2538540

Walt, S. M. (1987). *The origins of alliance*. Cornell University Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt32b5fc

Walt, S. M. (1988). Testing theories of alliance formation: The case of Southwest Asia. *International Organization*, *42*(2), 275-316. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300032823

Walt, S. M. (2002). Keeping the world "off-balance": Self-restraint and U.S. foreign policy. In G. J. Ikenberry (Ed.), *America unrivaled: The future of the balance of power* (pp. 121-154). Cornell University Press.

Waltz, K. N. (1971). Conflict in world politics. In S. L. Spiegel & K. N. Waltz (Eds.), *Conflict in world politics* (pp. 454-474). Winthrop Publishers.

Waltz, K. N. (1979). *Theory of international politics*. Addison-Wesley.

Yensabai, R. (2019). *Competing narratives in Cold War Thailand: Identity politics and the construction of foreign others* [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Leeds.